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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE TWO MILL LEVIES MADE BY THE DISTRICT FOR 
THE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS BUDGET ARE 
SEPARATELY AUTHORIZED. 
The state requires a levy of 23.25 mills, 
and the voters have directed a levy of 9 
mills, both of which levies were essential 
to prevent the District from incurring 
an unlawful deficit. 
II. THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL MILL LEVY 
The District did not exceed the limits of 
the two mill levies and did not collect or 
receive excess amounts of tax money. Courts 
are not permitted to enjoin taxes, and their 
injunctive power should not be used in an 
effort to do indirectly that which cannot be 
done di re ct 1 y. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION RESTS ON ERRONEOUS 
ASSUMPTIONS. 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that 
an accounting method (which is designed for 
the appropriation of uncertain revenues) was 
a funded reserve, that the so-called reserve 
was equivalent to unexpended fund balances 
and that a reserve of that sort would not be 
proper, even though there are no statutory 
provisions requiring school districts to 
maintain only a single, exclusive reserve. 
(See u.c.A. §53-20-2) 
1. The Budget Process. 
The budgeting process requires estimates 
to be made and involves discretion. Both 
revenue and expenditures involve 
unpredictable events which cannot be known 
when the budget is adopted before the 
beginning of the coming school year. 
Provisions must be made to meet the nee•ls 
and uncertainties of budgeting. 
-iv-
3. 
4. 
The Use of the Contingency Appropriations 
Accounts 14 
that some revenues can only be 
hoped for but not relied upon to material-
ize, the District uses the Contingency 
Appropriations Account to appropriate un-
certain revenue. As the year progresses, 
if those revenues do in fact come in, then 
the District will commit them. It will 
not spend against them until it is certain 
they are there, even though the District 
has many meritorious programs which could 
use such funds. 
The Undistributed Reserve 
Section 53-20-2 Authorizes districts to 
create an undistributed reserve (in 
specified amounts) which cannot be used 
in the negotiation or settlement of contract 
salaries. The purpose of the limitation 
is to isolate some revenue for the salary 
negotiation and settlement process. 
The Trial Court Has Ignored the Statutory 
Limits on the Undistributed Reserve in 
u.c.A. §52-20-2. 
If the undistributed reserve can (as 
the trial court allowed) be used for 
contract salaries once they are settled, 
then that reserve is no longer isolated 
from the salary bargaining process. Those 
neqotiating for salaries will know that 
tlte District has more funds available; 
they can force their release and require 
their use for their benefit. 
The llnexpended Fund Balances 
IJnexpended fund balances are cash and 
inventory which have not been expended and 
thus still available at the end of the 
hu,Jc3et year. The law provides for their 
arry-over to the next year's budget. 
1'11ey are ncit reserves or excessive 
-v-
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collection of revenue; they occur in the 
fortunate circumstance that costs and 
expenditures fell below estimates or that 
revenue exceeded expectations. 
6. The Respondents' Admissions. 
The Respondents have admitted all the 
crucial points about budgeting and the 
budgeting process; they have in fact 
admitted their case away. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CONFUSED ITS TERMS AND RELIED ON 
EXTRA-RECORD MATERIAL 
1. Since There Is No Exclusive Reserve, 
Reserves Cannot Be Distinguished by the 
Trial Court. r 
2. The Court Went Outside the Record In 
Making Its Decision. 
3. The Contingency Appropriations Account 
Is Not Secretive or Mysterious 
The trial court, confusing terms and 
misconstruing a statutory provision, 
ignored the factual record and relied on 
material outside the record in reaching 
its conclusions. It failed to understand 
the use of accounting methods, and thus 
incorrectly thought them unavailable for 
scrutiny. 
V. THE REMEDY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
IMPROPER AND INAPPROPRIATE. 
1. Attempts to Enjoin Taxation. 
By law, courts cannot enjoin taxes; they 
should not exercise their equitable 
powers in such a way as to accomrlish the 
-Vl-
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same result in other ways, especially when 
the relief they grant is ineffective and 
meaningless. 
COURTS SHOULD NOT MANDATE ACCOUNTING OR 
BUDGETING METHODS FOR THE DISTRICT. 
B,1cJgeting is an exercise of discretion; the courts 
should not try to mandate particular budget accounts 
in the absence of ministerial duty or illegality. 
VII. SCHOOL BOARD DECISIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD UNLESS 
THERE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR CLEAR 
ILLEGALITY. 
There is no abuse of discretion and no reason to 
require the Appellants to use one account and 
refrain from using another. There is no 
justification whatsoever for the use of the 
injuctive power of the trial court. 
VIII THE CREDIT RATING OF THE DISTRICT IS PLACED AT 
RISK BY THE INCORRECT DETERMINATION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT 
An imprope 
court's in 
to Jeopard 
rating. 
and incorrect exercise of the trial 
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ze the District's favorable credit 
i -
40 
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MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Yhe case involves claims that the defendants-appellants 
""''"'•"'(] the •n1 11 levy at too high a rate, incurring unexpended 
• s• t\.,,t chose few taxpayers who paid under protest should 
'"'' 1 rl1at the ilefendants-appellants have created an 
r .1, i 01 ted L>y U .C .A. §53-20-2 which allegedly 
P<•.lusive reserve; and that use of the undistributed 
',, "•ci ;y.J hy u C.A. §53-20-2 should be mandated. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The lo.Yer court granted injunctive relief to prohibit 
the use of the particular accounting method, the "Contingency 
Appropriations Account" (referred to as Item 0210.99 in the 
budget) and ordered that expenditures be made from 
uted reserve. The lo.Yer court reserved unti 1 after an appeal 
on the injunctive relief the amount, if any, of a tax refund. 
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The defendants-appellants request that this Court 
dissolve the permanent injunction and declare that they coul1 
in the past and may in the future use the contingency appropri-
ations account. They also seek declarations 1) that the mil; 
levy was proper, 2) that the undistributed reserve may not be 
used in the payment of contract salaries, even after salary 
negotiations have been completed and salaries have been settl 0 ' 
for the forthcoming school term, and 3) that the undistributec 
reserve is not an exclusive reserve. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiffs 
The plaintiffs-respondents (the "Respondents") are 
individual property owners or business and other entities w• 
property in the Salt Lake City School District (the "Dis-
trict"). They paid their property taxes for 1981-82 under 
protest. Many of the respondents are members of the Utan 
Taxpayers Association (the "UTA"), which prepared the suit a:· 
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,,,- i, i t,,,J both plaintiffs and contributions to support the 
suit (Pec()rrl ["R."] 297, 298) Lead plaintiff Jack Allen 
: '"'Hson") is the executive vice president of the UTA; 
, owar'i Stephenson ("Stephenson") is a research analyst for 
11.T.A. (Stephenson's name was transcribed "Stevenson" at his 
deposition.) (Olson Deposition ["Olson:] 3; Stevenson Deposi-
tion ["Steph."] 3) 
'!'he Allegations 
l'he Respondents allege that the Board of Education (the 
"Board") and the District have set the mill levy too high for 
fiscal year 1981-82 and have created an unlawful reserve 
in derogation of U.C.A. §53-20-2, which authorizes 
school districts to create an undistributed reserve. The 
Respondents allege that unexpended fund balances evidence the 
-wer-col lection of tax revenue from the mill levies. They 
s0ught injunctive relief to prevent use of the Contingency 
Account in the budget and to compel the 
Pespondents to use the undistributed reserve. They also seek a 
'efond nf the alleged over-collections in amounts which have 
Cieer1 Jprermined by the trial court. 
1'c:e l'r13l rtnd the Record. 
stipulation, the trial court decided the case on the 
•
11
""' 1 .; ""'l'e's in Lhe record, including deposition tran-
''''' and exhibits. No live testimony was presen-
·:.r1 t:_, i l-1e t_ t ial That court permitted its ruling on the 
" "" - r ·'l 1 c>f to be appealed as a final order. 
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4. Definition of Terms 
a. Reserve 
A reserve is a funded account held in the ready to mec. 
expenses which are frequently unpredictable. Thus, for 
example, the District has been a self-insurer for health, 
accident and unemployment insurance. (See R. 266, 237 [backs;, 
336, Goldsberry Deposition ["Golds."] 101) Si nee no one can 
predict what accidents will occur during the forthcoming year 
or the costs of the accidents which do happen, the budget is 
designed to set up a reserve available to cover accidents if 
they occur. 
b. Undistributed Reserve 
The undistributed reserve is a funded reserve autho-
rized by U.C.A. §53-20-2 which can be used for limited contin-
gencies. It is undistributed in the sense that it is not 
allocated to a particular item or function of the budget, but 
may be used in any area permitted by the statute. U.C.A. 
§53-20-2 provides that the undistributed reserve: 
"may not be used in negotiation or settlement 
of contract salaries for school district 
employees." 
The District has followed this mandate and has never at any 
time used any part of its undistributed reserve for contrac' 
salaries. Contract salaries are primarily the negotiaten, 
contract salaries for teachers. 
-4-
11,:- un,1istributed reserve is limited by statute to a 
,TidX11num ut 5% of a school district's maintenance and operation 
i"'l.& O ") budget; the amount permitted each district is deter-
mined by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (the 
"State Superintendent"). U .c .A. §53-20-2. That figure has 
been set at 1-1/2% of the M.& O. budget for Salt Lake. 
c. The Contingency Appropriations Account. 
The budget account in question is a designated account 
in the Instruction part of the District's budget. Its sub-
number and title have varied somewhat during the years covered 
by the complaint. In 1980-81 it was an account assigned the 
number 0210.99 (the "Contingency Appropriations Account"). 
Regardless of its subnurnber or name, its function has been the 
same each year. (R. 484 at 80) 
The Contingency Appropriations Account (sometimes referred 
to as the Line Item in the Record) represents an accounting 
ne'hod used by the District to facilitate handling of uncertain 
re··'enu-=s. Uncertain revenues are appropriated through the 
··,,nt1r.g""--" i>.ppropriations Account, but the District does not 
tham tn particular programs and accounts until the funds 
1r11 1 y 1 e'--ei ve(], When and if those revenues do 
· 1,,,.., _HP redistributed to specific needy accounts 
1--- most frequently within the Instruction area of 
' - '"•·1·w1 (,__,here contract salaries are handled). As an 
",'-lnl 'Jt tie unecrtain revenue, the District may anticipate 
-5-
receipt of a particular type of federal grant, but until He 
grant is actually made and the funds are present, the 
Appellants have been unwilling to spend against it. The mone, 
is hoped for but not certain; therefore, it is not committed 
until it is actually in hand. The Contingency Appropriations 
Account permits the District to plan for the grant 
optimistic view that it will materialize) (R. 484 at 80, 80-
d. Unexpended Fund Balances 
By law, a school district's budget must be prepared ir. 
June, prior to the forthcoming school year. The budget con-
sists of estimates of revenues and expenditures. U.C.A. 
&§53-20-1, 53-20-2, 53-7-9. As the school or fiscal year 
unfolds, the budget figures may be revised to account for 
actual events. (See R. 19-20, 31-36) For each of the years 
mentioned by the complaint, the District's initial budget 
planned for estimated expenditures to equal estimated revenou, 
(R. 484 at 51, 16-62, 65, 67) As those years developed, there 
were some expenditures which did not prove to be as large as 
estimated, and some accounts showed revenue exceeding costs 
year-end. Such left over revenue is called an unexpended fur•' 
balance or unexpended funds. The unexpended fund balances ma, 
consist of cash or inventory. 
Section 53-20-2 of the u .C .A. provides, in part' toa 
All unexpended balances of appropriations at 
the end of the fiscal year shall revert to 
the funds from which they were appropriated 
and shall be set up as revenue in the budget 
of the following year. 
-6-
(l,.'?r ·•ords, the law has recognized that unexpended funds 
"""Y 1,e i ricurc<>d and has provided for their carry-over to the 
next fis•·al year. In 1981-82, the District allegedly had an 
unexpended fund balance of approximately $2.8 million 
(unaudited figure) consisting of cash and inventory. 
The audited figure for school fiscal year 1981-82 was 
$l,078,909, less than half the amount alleged by the 
Responclents. ( R. 231) 
It shall be unlawful for any board of educa-
tion to make any appropriation in excess of 
the estimated expendable revenue, including 
undistributed reserves, for the ensuing 
fiscal year. U.C.A. §53-20-2. 
(R. 100) 
TI"le Respondents contend that the fact that the District has 
year-end fund balances demonstrates two things: first that the 
mill levies set by the District have been too high and have 
resulted in collection of too much money (which the plaintiffs 
seek to be refunded) and second, that the unexpended fund 
balances are a hidden or secret reserve kept in the Contingency 
;ppcopriat\ons Account in derogation of the provisions of 
u.r .. r1o §53-20-2. Analysis demonstrates that these contentions 
a1"' totally l;icking in merit. 
THf' TWO MILL LEVIES MADE BY THE DISTRICT 
r ''R THf: MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS BUDGET 
!"\RE SEPARATELY AUTHORIZED. 
I''µ r >o.t11ct levied only two mill levies. One is 
1'd I « ,· 1 • y U1e St ate and the other is directed by the voters 
IJ. C .A. §§53-7-9, 53-7-16. Neither of these 
"'I l 1,0 1." 1 > ["'int of the budgeting process· 
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The budget provisions in U.C.A. §53-20-2 do not 
authorize any tax levy; the levies are separately mandate1. 
Section 53-7-18 defines the minimum school program to incluje, 
basic, mandatory levy of 23.25 mills. 
In order to qualify for receipt of the 
state contribution toward the basic program 
and as its contribution toward its costs of 
said basic program, each school district 
shall impose a minimum basic tax levy of 
23.25 mills. u.c.A. §53-7-18. 
The second levy is the "voted leeway" which is authorized by 
the voters in the district. The voted leeway levy is now nine 
mills for the District. U.C.A. §53-7-19. The Code speci fi-
cally excludes these two levies from being determined by refer· 
ence to budget estimates. Since these were the only two lev'eo 
in the Di strict, there is no way that the Respondents can be 
entitled to a refund because of an allegedly excessive colle:· 
tion or levy. 
The District by state law must make the first levy: •-
has a voter mandate to assess up to nine mills on the second 
levy. So long as it operates within the legal limits of the 
mill levies, it cannot collect excessive revenue. State la\ .. · 
and the voters in the District have authorized its actions: 
regardless of the budget estimates, the full legal authorit) 
there and has never been exceeded by the District. 
Taxpayers dissatisfied by the leeway level may ini· 
an election to modify or decrease the leeway upon petiticn 
Thus, the law has already provided the remedy to a taxpa1•e· 
-8-
' tl•cit tl1e leeway has been set at too great a level. 
\'a)(payPrs have their legal remedy and the power to control the 
Their remedy is not a suit to collect alleged over-
payments or to mandate budget processes. So long as collect-
ions of taxes fall within the limits of the state mandated levy 
and the voter-directed leeway, there can be no illegal mill 
levy subject to challenge by Respondents. 
The Respondents thus have no reason to sue, and no 
claim which is cognizable in a court of law. Their complaints 
ahout the mill levy set by the Board under the leeway approved 
by their fella.; taxpayers and property a.;ners are not properly 
addressed to the courts of this state; they should be addressed 
to the voters by petition and through the electoral process. 
An injunction should not replace the electoral process or the law. 
II. THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL MILL LEVY. 
The Respondents have asserted that the District needed 
only $22,247,476 from property tax revenue to cover the M.& O. 
tJudget for fiscal 1981-82. This figure is $2,774,709 less than 
chP S25,002, 185 which was certified by the Board. Both the 
Resp<>n•1ents' rlaim and the amounts they use are incorrect. 
l';,•1 the Bodrl accepted the Respondents' figures in 
'"tt""l r!,, n•1ll IP•Y frir \981-82, and had the Board assessed a 
'11' ,_;_.,] fi• •mount, the Oistrict would have incurred an 
-9-
illegal deficit of $1,695,800. By law, school districts m;;y 
not incur a deficit. U .C .A. §53-20-2. Thus, in estimating 
budget for the next school year, the District must be exact to 
the penny (an almost impossible task, given the fact that the 
budget is a plan for events which have not yet occurred) or 
else come out ahead; it must not come out behind. As shown bv 
the comparative revenues, expenditures and changes in fund 
balances for fiscal years ending in 1981 and in 1982, the 
revenue raised through property taxes (based on the mill levy) 
and from other sources (interest on investments, other local 
revenue, state funds, federal revenue) for 1981 -82 fe 11 short 
of the year's expenditures by almost $350,000. The Di strict 
fortunately had for use an unexpended fund balance from the pre· 
vious year to avoid a deficit. (R. 244) The same was true fc: 
1980-81 when expenditures exceeded tax and other revenues by 
almost $2.5 million. A lower assessment would have caused a 
deficit. (R. 244) The District used all of the money raised 
by the tax levy and needed more money on top of that. Thus, 
the contention of the Respondents that there was an overly 
large levy and an excessive collection of tax revenue is 
totally inaccurate; the tax revenue was all used. At the 
proposed lower levy, the District would have incurred an un'. 2·• 
ful deficit. The Appellants did not over-tax. The courts 
should not at tempt to tamper with the mandated and authorize' 
levies required for and essential to the school programs. 
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l I l - THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION RESTS 
ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS. 
The Respondents have based their case on erroneous 
assumptions, incorrectly equating three separate and distinct 
things and concocting a theory of statutory interpretation to 
1ustify their claims. They have misinterpreted the Contingency 
Appropriations Account and unexpended fund balances as being 
reserves. The Respondents have next argued that by law the 
District may have only one reserve, the undistributed reserve 
authorized by U.C.A. §53-20-2. Since there are statutory 
limitations on the use of that reserve (that it cannot be used 
in the negotiation and settlement of contract salaries), they 
have reinterpreted this statutory limit to mean that the 
undistributed reserve can be spent on such salaries once nego-
t1ations end. The trial court accepted most of these notions, 
hut it did not find the undistributed reserve to be exclusive. 
In its opinion, some reserves are good, although not spelled 
out by statute, but the Contingency Appropriations Account is 
''ot 6 -,iood •_•r lawful reserve. These conclusions misapprehend 
h2 of the budget process, misuse terms and rest on 
;,"r., ;,,.,, s :Jualysis which are incorrect and unsupported. 
"1r ,,.1 i c- necessary to explore the problem. 
·1-1,e s"hrlol districts in this state use accrual method 
JL 1 111 11i A i,{ 1dqet, which is, by statutory definition, a 
c:- 1 1 1r1a t es (1· f'.A. 53-7-9) is adopted in June, 
-11-
before the school's fiscal year begins. U.C.A. §SJ-20-2 
Appellants collect whatever data is available and examine 
previous experience. They make the best and most accurate 
estimates they can of revenues and expenditures, making apprc-
priations and commitments in accord with the needs of the 
pupils to be served. When the budget is adopted in June, there 
is no way of knowing what events wi 11 occur; no one knows ho,, 
many pupils w i 11 enroll, and so the number of teachers and '.'' 
exact inventory needs cannot be known. Teacher salary negotia· 
tions are almost never completed by that time, so the Boarrl ca 
only estimate what will be required after negotiations are 
concluded. (R. 484 at 39) As time progresses, the estimates 
change. Salaries and benefits will be settled, and school wi:, 
start so the students can be counted. Other new information 
becomes available. The Board considers new figures and new 
estimates, and the budget may be revised. (R. 484 at 20, 
31-34) It is only when the previous year's budget can be 
audited that the actual revenues and expenditures can be 
determined; the June budget invariably differs from the auci'.". 
budget completed over a year later. 
Budgeting is thus performed in an atmosphere of uncer · 
tainty and contingency. Both revenues and expenditures are 
subject to imponderables and changes. (See Golds. 37, 49-'·c 
R. 315, 319-20) No one can predict what success the Count, 
will have in collecting tax revenue; the difference hetwee't 
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't'> "Llec11un and a 95% collection will have a serious impact 
u11 the fJ1 strict Interest rates vary, federal and state aid 
may be cut. In 1981-82, more than $1.8 million of 
expected revenue failed to materialize: 
( R. 2 36) 
3-1/2% reduction of state aid $ 886,000 
Estimated $6 reduction in weighted 
pupil unit ("WPU") because of 
state appropriation shortfall 
Estimated 1980-81 budget WPU 
total of all $27,702 
Property tax collection short 
Interest earnings short of 
estimate 
Total amount not allowed to be 
committed 
166,212 
519,281 
240,000 
$1,811,493 
On the expenditure side, there can be no foreknowledge 
of the number of accidents or their gravity, the number of 
pupils at what school level, the affects of weather on utili-
ties or snow removal. The Board must contend with variables 
NhJch include at least the following: 
Total property assessed valuation 
Percentage collection of taxes assessed 
County charges for tax collection 
Time taxes collected 
Shortfall in state contributions 
s across-the-board cutbacks 
Sh,)rt fall in federal funds 
1-1+-le 1 fun.ls 
ed interest income 
l)(\' r)\!f:-!l funds 
1J, i r-_, 1 1 t en r ,, l l men t 
11 • r ,,f t_eachers 
1 ·r11_,,r sulary negotiations 
-,r y cJ111l ">11ppl ies 
·,r- I I l 11<;11 needs 
I!µ r1 l t an, j a CC id en t Cl a i m S 
i 1r1Pmr1 I ·'\m1ent 
W•\l kmt-=>11' s con1pensation and industrial accidents 
[continued] 
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Sick leave 
Substitute teacher costs 
Contributions to retirement 
Extreme weather (utility bills, snCM removal) 
(R. 333) 
With so many variables to contend with, the budget car. 
only be a plan and a prediction based on prior experience; 
budgeting is not an exact science. 
2. The Use of the Contingency Appropriations Account. 
In such a context of unpredictability and with the 
legal requirement that there can be no deficit, some orderly 
method for accounting must be developed. During the courseo' 
the year, adjustments must be made, and some programs must be 
kept waiting or held in abeyance unti 1 it becomes more clear 
that they can be funded without incurring deficits. One such 
accounting method is the Contingency Appropriations Account:;· 
performs a "service" or "function" in the budget by permittinc 
the Board to anticipate uncertain revenues and to make appro-
priations of that revenue -- actual spending will occur only 
when the funds materialize. 
There are always meritorious programs waiting for 
funds; in 1981-82 the Board had almost $9 million in program 
requests which were waiting for approval and funding. These 
included restoring cuts in programs, $1.6 million; hiring 
teachers for the gifted students, $.759 million; returnin•J 
services to the handicapped to pre-1980-81 level, $1 millior· 
increased library book appropriations, $.15 million; increa'c 
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help for elementary and intermediate schools, $.27 
,.,illion; reducing pupil-teacher ratio by 3 students, $3.988 
miilion; and a number of other projects totaling $8,804,776 
million. (R. ;!40-41) If uncertain revenues come in, then the 
Board can consider such programs and implement the most impor-
tant ones. 
In any school budget, the Instruction expenditures are 
among the largest; they cover teacher salaries and are approxi-
mately 75% of the total M.& o. budget. Contingencies invar-
iably arise in those accounts so the Board placed the Contin-
gency Appropriations Account in the salary portion of the 
Instruction budget. When particular accounts have need for 
increased revenue or when revenue has fallen below expected 
levels, the Board turns first to the Contingency Appropriations 
Account to see if funds are available there; if they are, those 
funds will be used first. They will be redistributed within 
the budget framework and spent under a particular descriptive 
detail. (R. 451-52) The Respondents have failed to understand 
th1s relatively simple accounting method, alleging that the 
Contin<Jenry Appropriations Account is a "dummy" account and 
tr1at "o expenditures (or only one small one) have ever been 
ma 1i? f, "''" thF <'ont l'hJency Appropriations Account. In the 
"'""rl11_.c,; t·"lqPt fiqtlres for 1980-81, more than $1.5 million 
"'· 11 r10111 tl'lP C'untingency Appropriations Account. This 
1 'lEdn.::; ;,1 r, rnillJon of uncertain revenue materialized and 
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was thus available for spending during the fiscal year: 
Employee insurance and other fringe costs 
Consultant and supervisor salaries 
Teacher salaries 
Sabbatical leave salaries 
Substitute teacher salaries 
Tutor salaries 
Aide salaries 
Teaching supplies 
Consultants 
Other numerous small amounts 
$ 43 3' 113 
2 3' 088 
449, 013 
8, 376 
36, 567 
49' 26: 
100,373 
104, 84] 
62' 61, 
294,290 
$1,561,539 
(R. 337) In 1976-77, $1,820,824was distributed from the 
Contingency Appropriations Account; $1,646,650 in 1977-78; 
$1,731,856 in 1978-79; and $1,289, 531 in 1979-80. (The figure' 
are detailed at R. 243-46; 248-50; 252-54; 256-58.) The 
account is far from a dummy; the redistributions are duly set 
forth in revised and audited budget details for the District. 
The Contingency Appropriations Account has been used' 
the salary portion of the budget because of the provision ic 
U.C.A. §53-20-2 that the undistributed reserve cannot be use: 
in the negotiation and settlement of contract salaries. Like 
other areas of the budget, contract salaries are plagued by 
uncertainties which cannot be predicted in June when the b,idOi'. 
must be adopted. 
There are other reasons why the Contingency Apprurc'· 
tions Account serves useful purposes in the budget. One ;s 
that funds appropriated to particular accounts within the 
budget cannot be transferred at will and convenience. 
computerized budget control system is specifically proara1TU"' 
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so Uii'lt no expenditure will be approved unless there is a 
corresponding authorized appropriation to back the expenditure. 
(R. 452) Categorical revenues cannot be redistributed. 
(P"452) 
As a matter of prudent management, the Board has com-
mitted to certain of its department heads or management per-
sonnel, called budget managers, that if they can end the fiscal 
year under budget (that is, if they can carry out their respon-
sibilities but still economize), any unexpended funds left in 
the accounts they administer will be applied toward their 
budget appropriations for the following year. The budget 
managers are thus given an incentive to economize: they know 
that if they manage efficiently, their own departments will 
benefit in the coming year: any savings which they effect will 
help them and will not be used to bail out a less efficient 
department which has refused to economize or to help one which 
has met unforeseeable cost increases. (R. 452) The reverse 
technique is to cushion each account for contingencies, giving 
thE budyet manager more to work with than the minimum and 
Ictisir.·1 tltP rossibilily of overspending. The cushion method is 
'' -;aµ['tove•l '"'' 1n1l y by the Appellants but by the Respondents. 
'H 32J /-l ,].-,. n4-65, Steph. 54) 
'l'he c nit ingency Appropriations Account, when funds come 
l" hP!ps with the martaqement of unforeseeable contingencies 
v-i1r_tiout rc..,,,ciuiring P.xcessive administrative costs and without 
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disrupting budget commitments and management incentives. It 
provides a practical and widely used accounting technique for 
managing uncertain revenues. The same accounting methods anl 
experiences are common, if not universal, among Utah school 
districts. (See, e.g. R. 304, reproduced on the following 
page) 
The Appellants requested an opinion from the State 
Superintendent about the propriety of the budget methods 
used. Upon review of the budget process and the law, the 
Superintendent has concluded that the Appellants are acting 
lawfully. 
After reviewing §53-20-2 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), it is my opinion that the Salt Lake 
City School District's budgetary actions and 
fiscal policies regarding the handling of 
fund balances and undistributed reserves have 
been in compliance with provisions of 
§53-20-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953) during each 
year sice the 1976-1977 school year until the 
present [July 29, 1981]. (R. 296) 
The State Superintendent and school board are required by law 
to prescribe uniform accounting procedures for the school 
districts and to audit their accounts. 
The District's budgets have received national awards e' 
examples of good accounting principles. (R. 412-14) The 
budgets are audited annually, and no fault has ever been fo,,c,' 
and no illegality or questionable practice has ever been i ,Jee-
tified by an auditor with respect to the use of the Conun-
gency Appropriations Account. (R. 415, 416, 448) 
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UTAH SCHOOL DISTRICTS FUND BALANCE 
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES 
6/30/81 
M & 0 FUND PERCENT OF 
EXPENDITURE BALANCE EXPENDITURE 
A I pine 39,021,581 2,699,246 6.92% 
Beaver 1,975,204 254,660 12.89 
Box Elder 
Cache 12,924,201 l, 127'149 8.72 
Carbon 7,933,974 275, 131 3.47 
Daggett 718,029 14,856 2.07 
Dav Is 60 '966, 154 727,444 1.19 
Duchesne 6,797,847 117,016 l. 72 
Emery 5,557,873 691 ,298 12.44 
Garfield 2,357,865 148,609 6.30 
Grand 2,844,814 76,690 2.70 
G,-anite 97,732,710 6,142,011 6.28 
Iron 
Jordan 71,359, 161 2,234,088 3.13 
Juab 
Kane 1 ''l45. 560 205'182 10. 55 
Hi l 1ard 4,325,946 326,317 7.54 
M6rgan 2,333,937 97,929 4.20 
Nebo 18,938,383 l,234,849 6.52 
North Sanpete 3,111,220 323,734 10. 41 
Piute 990,693 143,085 14.44 
San Juan 9,218,619 1,779,728 19. 31 
Sev 1er 6,969,966 113,926 1. 63 
Tint ic 786,250 231 ,299 29.42 
Uintah 8,814,942 723,290 8.21 
Washington 9,523,381 317,460 3.33 
Waynp 1,192,874 106,929 8.96 
Murray 9, 145,800 243,436 2.66 
llorth Surrrni t l ,408,403 206,636 14.67 
Tooe I e 11,979,558 449,918 3.76 
Wasatch 3,679,418 893,626 24.29 
'ieber 30,366,'..'85 2,398,830 7.90 
Sa It lake 48,504,696 3,053,399 6.30 
Ooden 20,350,333 1 '161 ,822 5. 71 
18,204,918 641 ,038 3.52 
Logan 6,269,567 309,336 4.93 
(Previous page: EXHIBIT, UTAH SCHOOL DISTRICTS FUND BALANCE AS 
A PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES, from Record 304) 
The tJndistributed Reserve 
a. Legislative History and Purpose 
When Harmer was employed by the Utah Education Associa-
tion, he suggested that school districts should be using 
accrual method accounting. He and others familiar with such 
accoirnting and with problems which had developed in the course 
of teacher salary negotiations agreed that school districts 
needed to have a reserve fund which would not be available for 
teacher salaries and which would assist school districts in 
handling their budgets under the accrual method. Harmer worked 
with legislators to introduce and enact the statutory provi-
sions necessary to the accrual method. One of the resulting 
provisions is contained in U.C.A. §53-20-2, which authorizes an 
cnd1stributed reserve to be isolated from the negotiation and 
settlement of contract salaries. Harmer helped frame the 
16nguage and attended sessions on the bill. It was not his 
or that of the bill's legislative sponsors to make this 
reserve the sole and exclusive reserve which a 
•. ,; ·iisrrj.:t could have; rather, it was the intent to 
'.s•• i a 1 e some money from teacher salaries. When the 
•r•>1 1t was routine practice for school districts 
•>ti •<'sec·,-es. (See R. 446-47) Respondent Olson 
1 At l11s deposition that Harmer was "instrumental in 
i,_ 1 '".1·](1 t-h1: -:Jmr-:nJment to the law, and getting it introduced." 
-19-
The legislative history of U.C.A. §53-20-2 gives nn 
indication that the reserve there provided was to be exclu 51 ,_,e 
or that it would change existing budget practices to prevent 
the use of reserves. The provision was passed with the simple 
recognition that employees seeking favorable wage and salary 
contracts would push for every possible penny from the budget; 
some funds needed to be excluded from the salary negotiations 
and contract settlements if the districts were to handle their 
budgeting smoothly and efficiently. 
The statute is silent as to exclusivity; it simply 
permits school districts to create such a reserve with amounts 
not exceeding certain levels. Respondents' expert Goldsberry 
and Respondent Stephenson both admitted that the reserve is net 
an exclusive one. (Golds. 101, The trial 
court did not find it exclusive. 
Steph. 75, R. 336) 
(See R. 485-98) 
It has been the Appellants' position and their practice 
not to use the undistributed reserve in connection with con-
tract salaries, it is reserved for contingencies in 
portions of the budget. Given this strict observance of the 
law, the Appellants must look elsewhere to meet contingencies 
which arise as to salaries which are three-quarters of the 
budget. It is here that the Contingency Appropriations Acc,JC· 
comes into use. It has also been the policy of the Appella:t 3 
to look for funds in that account first; if those 
revenues have come in, the District uses them hefore it tin"' 
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,-1,.., uwL1strit,uted reserve, leaving that funded reserve 
intact whe11e,Ier possi hle. 
4. The Trial Court Has Ignored The Statutory Limits 
on The Undistributed Reserve In U.C.A. §53-20-2. 
The Respondents have argued for, and the trial court 
has apparently concurred in, an incorrect interpretation of the 
undistributed reserve provisions in U.C.A. §53-20-2. In the 
process, the trial court has actually amended the statute. 
The statute's purpose was to permit school districts to 
reserve some funds which would be isolated from the contract 
salary portion of the budget and which would not be available 
for salary increases. Nonetheless, the trial court stated from 
the bench: 
It appears that the language of the statute 
about wages is reasonably clear in its con-
text to relate to the labor negotiating 
process, and it's talking about settlements 
of contract negotiations and settlement of 
the contract, and once that is arrived at, 
salaries ordinarily might be one of the more 
predictable kind of items in a budget. And 
once that's been determined then it seems to 
the Court that you are not going back and 
dipping into a fund that the legislature has 
put beyond the reach of the board, then you 
are utilizing it for contingencies in a 
a1ea, sickness, or any number of 
t1·,1flgs, and that account would certainly be 
to cover those contingencies. (R. 491) 
1, ••!<lry portion of any school district budget is one 
·1,, this District it represents almost three-
·.,, 1 ers !' s c>xpenses Like any other item in a school 
s,::i1'1.rles are tJncertain and subject to 
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unforeseeable variables. Since the Board has followed the 
language and intent of the statute by isolating and keeping 
isolated the undistributed reserve from contract salaries, the 
Contingency Appropriations Account has aided the District in 
meeting contingencies in this area. 
Negotiations for contract salaries are almost never 
concluded by the time the budget must be adopted; the Board 
must make its budget with the negotiations incomplete and must 
estimate what it believes it can afford and can negotiate 
successfully at the bargaining table. The one thing which was 
considered certain ( unti 1 this decision was rendered) was that 
the employees' salary negotiators could not rely on or dip int: 
the undistributed reserve. The District had 1-1/2% of its 
M.& o. budget which was isolated from contract salaries. 'lo"' 
that limitation has been effectively amended out of the sta-
tute. By the trial court's interpretation, the teachers kn™ 
that the reserve is not truly unavailable to them. They can 
hold out for greater increases because they know that as soon 
as the negotiations end, the money from the undistributed 
reserve will be released and can be spent for contract sala-
ries. Not only is the statutory exception ignored, but th• 
teachers and others with contract salaries know that they c·e 
force the Board to use that money; the undistributed reserve 
right back in the negotiations and settlement of contract 
salaries. The Board no longer has lines beyond 'which salary 
-2 2 -
I'•) () t_ l °J ,--, I '.__, The Board is no longer bargaining 
.::i. µt._i1_2· tP'l re\:eriue to meet other needs. The trial court 
•a• clearly incorrect in its interpretation of the statutory 
ronditlons imposed upon the expenditure of the undistributed 
reserve, This Court should declare that the statute means what 
it says' that the undistributed reserve is not to be used in 
contract salary negotiations or settlements. 
). The Unexpended Fund Balances. 
An unexpended fund balance means that the actual expen-
ses have fallen short of predicted levels or else revenue has 
exceeded expectations, so that some funds or some inventory has 
been left at year-end. State law requires such funds to be 
ca1ried over to the next year's budget. u.c.A. §53-20-2. 
of these funds will be earmarked into particular categories 
Oecause they derive from categorical revenue; some are 
ear'llarked because of the management commitments made by the 
to its bu<iget managers. These fund balances do not 
lerive only from or equate to funds set forth in the 
Contin3ency Appropriations Account. 
f1r'iny 1,1,e next page is a Comparative Statement of 
Some 
r,1pendi ''"es and Changes in Fund Balance, comparing 
., 1 1 .. ne 30, 1982 and June 30, 1981. ( R. 234) 
The District had, as of July 1, unappropriated fund 
balances of $4,571,294 -- funds carried over from the prior 
fiscal year according to the requirements of U.C.A. §53-20-2. 
In that same year, the District received revenues of $46 
million, but incurred expenses of over $48.5 million -- an 
excess of expenditures in the amount of $2.4 million over 
year's revenues. That deficiency was in effect covered from 
the fund balances; at the end of the fi seal year, the District 
was able to carry over, for the 1981-82 fiscal year, a fund 
balance of $2,173,885. Thus, by the end of that fiscal year, 
there <Nas a fund balance slightly over $1 million to be carrie! 
over to the next budget. Even with that balance, the Di strict 
spent more than it received from taxes, so there was no exces· 
sive levy. 
The unexpended fund balances can be traced from year '.c 
year. Their amounts are reported in the budget estimates anc 
in the audited reports. They are not evidence of a reserve er 
of a hidden Contingency Appropriations Account account; they 
simply show that the District was able to end the year withac'. 
spending every penny that it had available; it carried over 
some funds for the next year. Unexpended fund balances aro 
no way improper or unlawful; they are contemplated by the \d .. : 
which has made provision for them. u.c.A. §53-20-2. 
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tlAINTENAtlCE AtJD OPERATION FUND 
(The General Fund) 
·0mparat1ve Statement of Revenues, Expendutures and Changes 
in Fund Balance 
Years Ended June 30, 1982 and 1981 
Re\7€nues: 
Property taxes 
Interest on investment 
Other local revenue 
State of Utah 
Federal government 
Total Revenues 
Expenditures: 
/\dministration 
Instruction 
Attendance-Health Services 
Pupil Transportation 
Operation of plant 
, 0 Maintenance of plant 
fixed Charges 
re 
Student body activities 
Community services 
Total Expenditures (Note 
Excess (deficiency) of Revenues 
over Expenditures 
fund Balances Unappropriated - July 1 
Decrease in reserve for encumbrances 
fJecr.,ase in P.1 .. 874 Revenue 
reserved for succeding year's budget 
IncrE-o.r::c l n J 11 'e11 r_ory reserve 
1-11 • .=,r1,-es T1n;;pl1rupr lated - June 30 
-t,._,c. 1111.'1r1° statements. 
1982 
$24,865,914 
2,321,115 
748' 724 
19,898,891 
3,699,906 
51,504,550 
657,143 
31,202,383 
412,815 
659,390 
4,544,643 
1,617,376 
11,000, 905 
72,204 
1,683,702 
51,850,552 
(346,002) 
53,356 
(833,673) 
$1,078,909 
1981 
$22,240,934 
1,240,934 
786,699 
16,923,733 
4,613,702 
46,128,666 
615,194 
29,463,761 
393,715 
597,151 
4,066,039 
1.571,105 
9,652,838 
67,704 
2,136,458 
48,563,965 
(2,435,299) 
(!2, 173 .ss"S) 
(Previous page: EXHIBIT, COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF REVENUES, 
EXPENDITURES AND CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE, Record 234) 
One peculiar aspect of this case is the extent to which 
the Respondents, particularly by their expert witness, have 
admitted away their case. They have admitted that budgeting 
involves discretion, that contingencies can and do occur in 
every aspect of the revenue and expenditure sides of the 
hudget, that the undistributed reserve is not exclusive, that 
budgeting through the Contingency Appropriations Account is 
more prudent than cushioning accounts, that the District's 
budgets have been reasonable when the amounts of any unexpended 
fund balances are compared to the total budget and, signifi-
cant!y, that the Respondents are unable to suggest alternative 
methods which the District could adopt to get better budgets or 
mere accurate estimates in June for the events of the coming 
year. 
Goldsberry, a certified public accountant specializing 
1n municipal accounting, testified at a deposition as an expert 
''rl hel1alf of the plaintiffs. His credentials are impeccable. 
The Respondents contend that the undistributed reserve 
'l-1'?% nf the M.& O. budget) described in U.C.A. §53-20-2 
• l><si ve reserve fund that the District can have. 
_,_.-;s1•P1. J ,r.: .. 1a.l position was: 
Tt's your position or your opinion that any fund 
halanrP in excess of one and a half percent would be 
1n1;iutr1or 1 zed and illegal 7 
Yes. (Golds. 14, R. 309) 
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However, shortly after setting forth this position, Goldsberr 
began admitting exceptions to it, and before his deposition'"' 
finished, his admissions were so broad and so numerous that h• 
had made a full-scale retreat from the Respondents' basic 
premise. 
Q Under the law, in your opinion, can the 
district create a reserve for inventories? 
A Yes. 
Q Under the law, in your opinion, can they 
create a reserve for self insurance? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know of any other reserves that they 
might create that would be admissible under the law? 
A I be 1 i eve they've been using public law 874 
money in the reserve. 
Q When we said that they could have a reserve 
for inventories and self insurance, can that be in par-
of the one or is that in addition to? 
A No. I believe that's in addition to. 
(Golds. 101, R. 336, emphasis added) 
Goldsberry also admitted that the Board must deal wit'. 
many variables on both sides of the ledger. Federal aid is 
imponderable, the number of pupils who will attend, thus 
affecting state aid, is unpredictable, and even interest 
is not fixed. (Golds. 48 R. 318) The Board would not even 
know in May, when it is working on the tentative budget, how 
much revenue it could carry over to the next fiscal year. 
(Golds. 49 R. 319) Expenditures, he agreed, also vary. 
Q Are you familiar with the fact that in the 
Salt Lake City School District that they are sdf-
insurers for health and accident, industrial 
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n· c ident and unemployment payments? 
A Yes, I believe I knew that. 
u And aren't those variables that no one can 
tell wllat will happen in a particular year? 
A Yes. (Golds. 49-50, R. 319-20) 
Goldsberry agreed that the Board could not know in advance 
about unemployment compensation, inventory changes based on 
pupil enrollment, teachers' sick leave, the number of substi-
tute teachers that would be needed. (Golds. 50, R. 320) In sum: 
A Okay. Expenditure side, variables[,] 
weather could be a factor, maybe snow removal would be 
a factor, maintenance could be a factor. You could 
have variables in every one of your accounts, revenue 
and expenditures. 
!Golds. 37, R. 315, emphasis added). He also says the Board 
has discretion in dealing with the budget. 
Q Well, do they have some discretion? That's 
different. 
A They have some discretion when the make the 
budget, that is correct. Golds. 29, R. 311, emphasis added) 
Q My question is, was it appropriate for the 
board to make some allowances for those kind of 
unforeseen contingencies? 
A 
bl lit y 
Yes. To weight that budget for that possi-
(Golds. 38, R. 316) 
The question the11. is how can they exercise their discretion? 
.. ,,e"r ·,., 1.1 n, •t increase the hudget for separate i terns and 
' ! r) \ 1 =:il11011 jn the accounts. 
1t isn't really a very good policy to put 
"u·o;hicrn in a budget and say, "I want you to come in 
1e• !Juclqet," it's better to have a tight budget and 
;nv 1-,, them, "I want you to come in on budget." Isn't 
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that the way to approach it? 
A Ideally, yes. (Golds. 64-65, R. 323-24) 
Nonetheless, some provisions need to be made for the imponder-
ables of budgeting, and Goldsberry himself would probably try 
to make provision for them. (Golds. 38-39, R. 316-17, emphas's 
added.) 
Q The concept, without defining reasonable, ari 
you willing to agree that there can be some reasonable 
percentage of tolerance that the school board can 
exercise? 
A Yes. Without calling for a conclusion on my 
part, yes,-I-can say that. (Golds. 32-33, R. 313-14, 
emphasis added.) 
Q If the estimated revenues is within a range 
of 0 to 5 percent, wouldn't you think that that's 
showing some responsibility? 
Q From a hindsight standpoint and, again, 
forgetting about the technicality of the one and a ha" 
percent thing, let's just talk about a budget that naj 
be 62 million dollars, and if they come in within three 
or four percent of having appropriated and spent 
three or four percent of the revenues which, in fact, 
came in, would you say that that would be within 
reasonable limits? . 
A Okay. You' re also allowed approximately ore 
and a half percent of that 62 million dollars or 
$ 900, 000 in that reserve account. I would say for a 
specific time frame that probably the two and a half 
million dollars as a result of the events is reason-
able. Your question is, is what we do with that two 
and a half millions when we budget that the follawi ng 
year. (Golds. 32-33, R. 313-14, emphasis added) 
The contested amount in this suit is approximately $2.8 mill!. 
dollars in the pre-audit unexpendecl fund balance or $ l mi 1 L. 
audited, an amount well within Goldsberry' s reasonable fjqu· 
The question is still how to deal with those f•inc 
balances. 
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Q If the school district doesn't know for sure 
ho•,i much money it's going to receive, don't you think 
1t wnuld be proper not to allocate in advance those 
but if the funds do, in fact, come in, then 
utilize them for projects that are standing in the wing 
!eady to be implemented? 
A Surely. (Golds. 72-73, R. 325-26, emphasis 
added, see also R. 243-46) 
Goldsberry has now fully agreed with the position of the school 
defendants. 
After all of these admissions, Goldsberry admitted even 
further that he does not know a method which the school defen-
dants could use to handle the budget better. 
Q (BY MR. BUSHNELL) You talk about a fund. I 
call it contingency appropriated funds. It's a con-
tingency because they don't know what money they're 
going to get and the expenses they're going to have. 
Don't you think they have the right to provide some 
mechanism for those eventualities, regardles of whether 
you like the term; don't you think they have the right 
to provide for those eventualities. 
THE WITNESS: They have the right in their 
individual line items to provide for that. 
Q (BY MR. BUSHNELL) You're talking about the 
mechanics of how they do it. Let's take it a step at a 
time. Do you agree that the Board of Education has the 
right, and I'll go so far as the duty, to provide for 
eventualities of overexpenditures and underreceipt of 
income? 
A Yes. 
U (BY MR. BUSHNELL) It would be a responsible 
lhinq f,:;1 the board to do, isn't that true? 
A Tt would be a responsible thing. 
, • I.Pt's go the next step where you want to go 
,.,,1, thF1t 1s, that you don't agree with the mechanics 
tloP:cdi:2_it, isn't that right? 
That's correct. (Golds. 59-60, R. 321-22, 
..... 111r,11ds1 s ndcled) 
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Goldsberry' s testimony shows that there is no substance to n .• 
Respondents' complaint; there is only a question of account inc 
form. 
Q How do they do that, then, to do it proper! 
in your opinion? 
A Well, I think I've referred to that in 
earlier testimony, based on their history of events. 
Q Let's take the history that every year 
there's things that they didn't anticipate both as to 
expenditures and as to revenue. One year it might not 
be Federal funds, one year it may be the Governor 
cutting it back, one year it might be lack of collec-
tions, another year it might be utilities running over, 
another year, it might be teachers, but the history has 
been that there has been some of those 
i terns each year. 
Starting with that assumption, you told us 
you don't want it in a particular line item and you 
don't want across the board percentage increase in all 
of the accounts. Tell me how they can properly work i• 
out so that they don't fall short? 
A Well, you know, I feel like the criteria tha'. 
has developed over the years in performing that budget 
is the criteria that you use in preparing that budget. 
Q And the criterion has said we have to do it. 
But I'm asking you mechanically how they do that. 
A That's how they do it. They evaluate that 
criteria. 
Q We' re talking about the need and method that 
we carry it forward. I'm having you assume that 
there's a need based upon the criteria from prior year; 
and I'm now asking you to tell me how is the proper 
method to do it since you don't like the one we've 
already talked about, one, a contingency factor in 
every account or a contingency account. What is there 
left that we can do to guard against that? 
A I've a 1 ready gone on record as saying the 
contingency account to me is misleading and imprope• 
disclosure. 
Q I've said that. You said it woul<1 be irnpr. 
per to take a certain percentage and apply it all 
-30-
the accounts? 
A I said that. You would have to look at the 
specific account you're budgeting for and look at the 
rriteria that makes that account out. You're asking me 
to be specific, you know, asking me to be specific for 
a specific budget item or something. 
Q No, I'm not. I'm going to do it again 
because I think you're really -- at this point you've 
said what we do is wrong, but you haven't told us what 
we can do to make it right. Let me give you the 
hypotheticals. The hypotheticals are that the history 
has been that we'll have shortfalls in various accounts 
and we'll have overexpenditures sometimes in various 
accounts and they don't consistently follow to be the 
same one. One time it might be teachers, public util-
ities, one time it might be supplies on what we were 
overexpending and on the other side sometimes the money 
is collections from the county, sometimes it's failure 
to get the State funds, sometimes it's the Governor 
arbitrarily cuts everything off through there. That's 
the history. As a responsible school board they have 
said, "I don't know what it's going to be this year, 
but we need to protect ourselves so that we don't 
violate the law and spend more money than what we have 
appropriated." My question is, with that 
problem presented, how is a proper way to do it? 
A Well, I guess I can't answer your question. 
All I know is what has transpired, that they have 
actually collected more than they have spent. (Golds. 
93-96, R. 329-32, emphasis added) 
In other words, Respondents' expert does not know how else the 
Schoo\ Board can handle the budget; he cannot offer a better 
method or a clearer form. With such admissions, there is no 
issue for the Court to resolve. The Appellants face contin-
'Jer.cies on beotl1 si<'les of their balance sheet, they have discre-
- ''-'" th2v "r"' "''t confined to a 1-1/2% total fund balance, the 
I 1 '"'t e<cJusive, they should not cushion budgets, they 
·IC ri1p1_ i ',"'-1r>qe11cies as they arise. They have a method for 
-,,.·, 1 '"1 the l•uliget which Respondents dislike but do not know 
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how to improve. Apparently, the Appellants just do not ma,e 
their estimates as accurately as the Respondents would lii<e, 
although the unexpended fund balances are reasonable in amocc.· 
given the uncertainties and the size of the budget. 
Respondents' expert admits that there is no substance or meri: 
to the complaint; this case is all a matter of form. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CONFUSED ITS TERMS AND RELIED 
ON EXTRA-RECORD MATERIAL 
1. Since There Is No Exclusive Reserve, Reserves Cannoo 
Be Distinguished by the Trial Court. 
The trial court accepted the Respondent's unsupporte: 
assertion that the Contingency Appropriations Account is a 
reserve, but it rejected the Respondents' argument that the 
District may maintain only one reserve, the undistributed 
reserve authorized by U.C.A. §53-20-2. The trial court is 
correct that the undistributed reserve is not exclusive; lec:i 0• 
lative history, school practice before and since 
of the undistributed reserve and the State Superintendent al: 
show the propriety of other reserves. 
However, the trial court made an unsupported choice 
among reserves, designating some as good and others as not. 
The trial court decided that the Contingency Appropriations 
Account is not a good reserve; it felt it had been 
the Appellants in excess of their authority. That suppose' 
reserve is allegedly different from reserves for inventor,·' 
self-insurance because the trial court considers them to 
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more open to public scrutiny than the Contingency 
Appropriations (R. 488-89) 
The striking thing to the Court in terms 
of the account that we're talking about is 
that even those that are not specified by 
statute, namely the reserve for inventory and 
the reserve for self-insurance, notwithstand-
ing that they are not in the statute, they 
are not contingent kinds of items, as such, 
and they are identified kind of expenditures. 
(R. 488-89, emphasis added) 
The Contingency Appropriations Account, assuming that it is a 
reserve (which the School Appellants do not concede), had been 
used to cover contingencies when uncertain revenues had come 
in. But distinguishing reserves for inventories and self-
insurance from that Account because they are not "contingent" 
is fallacious. Inventory is not a stable, predictable item. 
The items in inventory vary according to changes in the cur-
riculum, the number of students, the number of teachers and the 
costs of the items themselves. Costs vary with inflation, 
scarcity of materials and other factors. Such factors vary 
ever they raise contingencies, and a reserve for inven-
tory must manage contingencies and be operated in a context of 
chanoe. much of it unforeseeable. 
Self-insurance deals with even greater numbers of 
No one knows which teachers will fall ill or be 
expenditures from the self-insurance 
·e. ''" knows when an ankle will be broken rather than 
'o c" L ''" 1 01 .,.. h y a cut on a teacher' s hand needed ten stitches 
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but missed an artery or a tendon. Insurance, by its very 
nature, deals with probabilities and contingencies, not 
certainties. The trial court's distinction between different 
kinds of reserves simply does not bear analysis. If these 
other reserves for inventory and insurance are legal 
specified by statute, then the undistributed reserve cannot be 
exclusive. Surely the statute does not permit trial courts to 
accept or reject reserves on the basis of their unsupported 
views that some things are contingent and others are not 
(though common sense says those things are in fact contingent) 
The Contingency Appropriations Account, not being a reserve, 
cannot be prohibited by the trial court's analysis; U.C.A. 
§53-20-2 does not prohibit contingency appropriations and does 
not create an exclusive reserve. It does not permit the tria'. 
court to approve some reserves, misclassify an accounting 
method as a reserve and then enjoin its use. The trial court 
recognized that it was dealing with an accounting case (R. 486 
but failed to recognize and distinguish accounting principle 
methods and terms. The trial court said: 
At the outset, the Court observes that 
this is an accounting case, not a levy case, 
not a tax case, not an assessment case .... 
(R. 486, emphasis added) 
Despite this, the trial court ignored accounting ter·, 
and methods. The trial court disregardeo the only factual 
evidence in the record - that of Goldsberry and Harmer. 
is an expert in the field; he is a member of the Natinnal 
,:oun, 1 I ,[ ,-;,, 'er nmental Accountants ( "NCGA") - the group which 
sets tLe standards for generally accepted accounting principles 
for qovernmental agencies. Harmer is also chairman of the 
NCGA's Technical Guidance Committee which routinely provides 
technical advice on handling difficult problems of accounting 
to governmental agencies. (R. 484 at 49) 
2. The Court Went Outside the Record 
In Making Its Decision. 
In its oral decision, the trial judge, a former Public 
Service Commissioner, commented that Emery County's school 
board had accumulated reserves of several million dollars from 
rn1nes and from utilities, and that other school districts had 
created reserves and were less responsible than this District. 
The trial court said: 
In Erner y County I don't know where they got 
their reserve, but they gave testimony before 
the Public Service Commission that they had a 
reserve figure of, it seems to me, six or 
eight or ten million dollars, a fairly sig-
nificant amount of money which could have 
built more school space, to be sure, without 
hav1ng to rely on capital funds or on bond 
issuPs at all. A.nd they profited from the 
m111,"s anJ from the Utah Power & Light plants 
an,4 s,, fnrth, and then were screaming at the 
Publir= Service Commission because we were 
1c1 take part of the tax base away by 
)..,, 1 n'J lltah Power & Light sell it to the 
'"1"1,_·1palities that weren't subject to taxes. 
11,i,11' yo11 see examples in various 
',,, L' i" Ls where they have developed very 
reserves which exceed Salt Lake 
'1ty's """really don't have the responsibil-
1•1,,,., that the Salt Lake City board has. 
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So I sort of think that the legislature 
intended that there be something more consis-
tent about how school boards operate than 
what's being accomplished in terms of the 
current budgeting process. (R. 496) 
Thus, the trial court was influenced by the testimony of a 
different school board before a different public agency on a 
different matter. This case was apparently used as a vehicle 
for rectifying another grievance from another time and place. 
Such should not be the basis for or an influence upon injunc-
tive relief against these Appellants. 
3. The Contingency Appropriations Account Is Not Secrefr,.0 
or Mysterious. 
The trial court was also incorrect in believing that V· 
Contingency Appropriations Account was not open to public sere 
in the same way that a reserve for self-insurance or inventory 
would be available. There is no evidence in the record to sup:: 
such a conclusion. There are no allegations of any procedural 
regularity other than the creation of the Contingency Appropn· 
ations Account. 
The Contingency Appropriations Account was present ir. · 
budget during each of the years mentioned by the complaint. 
budget was adopted after public hearing. There is 
evidence of public scrutiny of the budget each year. 1n<lee•4, 
UTA itself, sponsor of the suit, has analyzed the budgets e:i 
year; UTA was represented by its executive director Olson or 
research analyst Stephenson at the budget hearings. In bct'1 
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·,·:ritten and oral statements, they commended each year's budget and 
concurred 01 supported adoption of the budgets. (See Olson 13, 
15: Steph. 47) They scrutinized and approved the budget each 
ye;i.r until 1981-82: the fiscal year when the Board imposed its 
first increase in the mill levy in three years. (See R. 301) 
When the 1982-83 budget hearings were held, after the 
commencement of this suit, Olson again appeared on behalf of 
the UTA, and he again complimented the Board on its budget. At 
the hearing, Olson questioned Harmer about the Contingency 
Account (account 0210.99). Olson asked: 
What is the purpose of 0210.99? Maybe I've 
never understood the definition of that. 
(R. 411, emphasis added) 
In a nutshell, that is the problem with this case: the 
executive director of UTA, the UTA and the parties it has 
snlicited have sued because of confusion about an accounting 
an undistributed reserve and an unexpended fund bal-
anre. Injunctive relief to interfere with the discretion of a 
school board in preparing and operating its budgeting must rely 
un s0n1<0t hi ng mnr;o than misunderstanding and confusion. There 
's ,· r11J,' ng what sue •ter in this record to meet the criteria for 
r c_·l 1 et (See Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
·1,_ tr'"' court's decision must be reversed; it 
'lt 1 assumptions and incorrect analysis. 
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V. THE REMEDY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
IMPROPER AND INAPPROPRIATE 
1. Attempts to Enjoin Taxation. 
When the Respondents originally commenced this action, 
they obtained a temporary restraining order to restrain the 
Appellants from setting the mill levy for the coming fiscal 
year at their proposed level and to require the mill levy to 
set at a lower rate. Because U.C.A. §59-11-10 prohibits court; 
from enjoining taxes, the Respondents were denied a prelirninar;· 
injunction. They amended their complaint, stating their new 
theory about the impropriety of the Contingency Appropriations 
Account, still seeking to interfere with the District's 
and budgeting procedures. 
The trial court has granted two forms of injunctive 
relief: a prohibitory injunction to prevent the Appellants 
from using the Contingency Appropriations Account and a 
tory injunction to require that the Appellants make expendi-
tures from the undistributed reserve. 
The object of these injunctions is still to interfere 
with taxing by the Appellants. The Respondents' theory, like 
their use of fundamental terms, is somewhat roundabout and of 
questionable effectiveness. Apparently the Respondents belie•;e 
that if there is no Contingency Appropriations Account there 
will be no reserve and no unexpended fund balances. RequirJ'•·' 
the District to use its undistributed reserve instea<l of the 
Contingency Appropriations Account (despite statutory liinita· 
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,10ns on the fund) is apparently designed to reduce unexpended 
fund balances and to reduce mill levies. Respondents' attack 
on lhe Contingency Appropriations Account, their theory of 
exclusive reserve and their concern with unexpended fund bal-
ances demonstrate one thing: they are trying to do indirectly 
1•hat the law prohibits them from doing directly. They still 
want to enjoin taxing authority. 
In point of fact, part of the injunctive relief is 
meaningless. The budget can be designed without the Contin-
gency Appropriations Account. Since the budget adopted each 
June is an estimate, and since the Contingency Appropriations 
Account lists revenue the Board hopes for but cannot count on, 
the budget can simply be drafted without appropriation of such 
revenues. If those revenues later materialize, the Board can 
re·; i se the budget, appropriate the newly arrived funds and 
commit and expend them for needy accounts. The Contingency 
Appropriations Account will be absent and will affect the mill 
levy no more than it does now (which is not at all). Once it 
is understood that the Contingency Appropriations Account is 
merely an accounting methodology to provide an orderly way to 
•nticipate and appropriate uncertain revenues, the injunctive 
'
1·11,cf ii<--c<)mes meaningless. The Board cannot rely on uncertain 
tn cover the heart of its programs; it must seek more 
J2"11<Jt'". 111<>rp certain revenue from its levying mandates in 
'
11 
" "'eet the needs of the District and to prevent a 
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deficit. Courts should not involve themselves in meaningles, 
exercises such as enjoining the use of the Contingency Appro-
priations Account. 
Injunctive relief ... is not appropriate where 
there would be little or no benefit to the 
complainant. Penelke, Inc. v. John Price 
Associates, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 
1982) 
The mandatory injunction to require expenditures from 
undistributed reserve is relief of a somewhat different nature 
and will be discussed below. 
VI. COURTS SHOULD NOT MANDATE ACCOUNTING OR 
BUDGETING METHODS FOR THE DISTRICT 
It is well settled in this state that courts should net 
issue mandates to compel administrators to perform in a speci-
fie manner first, absent a clear ministerial duty or second, 
when discretion is involved. The instant decision violates 
this principle on both counts. The trial court has ordered fr,e 
Appellants to make expenditures for contingencies from the 
undistributed reserve, regardless of circumstances and wi t>iout 
regard to statutory limitations on that reserve. It has aiso 
enjoined the use of an accounting technique in a budgeting 
process which must cope with estimates and which must rest on 
discretion. Neither is the proper subject of injunctive 
relief. 
Utah law was restated in Tuttle v. Board of EducatL 
of Salt Lake City, 294 P. 294 (Utah 1930). Plaintiff there 
sought a writ of mandate to compel the Board to use certain 
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in the school budget which had been used 
:1i 1i. ,,,1,11Js ;/ea.rs The Supreme Court denied the relief, con-
eluding that the budget categories were substantially equiva-
Jent to those used in prior years. The Supreme Court stated: 
There is a further question involved. 
Mandate does not lie unless the relator or 
petitioner shows a clear legal right to the 
performance of the act demanded and a plain 
duty of the officer, board, or other tribunal 
to perform it as demanded, and where the duty 
to perform the act is doubtful, or where a 
discretion is imposed or involved in the 
performance of it, mandate ordinarily will 
not compel the performance of it in a parti-
cular way or manner. We have held that many 
times. That in making and adopting a budget 
some discretion and judgment is imposed on 
and is required by the board may not well be 
doubted. The statute does not prescribe the 
kind of classification of titles and accounts 
to be made by the board, or how full and 
complete it is to be made, whether by only a 
general classification or to what extent the 
classification is required to descend to 
particulars or details. The requirement of 
the statute in such particular is that the 
classification shall be equivalent to the 
district's classification. But how or in 
what manner the district's classification is 
to be made, or how the classification is to 
be made to appear, or to be ascertained or 
determined, likewise is not prescribed. From 
all this it is apparent that to compel the 
board to make a particular kind of budget, or 
Orie speci fi call y demanded by the plain-
t1 f fs, r·,r to direct what subjects or state-
me.1ts .,;:--;;;numerations or details are to be 
st_dt•:·I Ln-the-budget and to compel or coerce 
make such or any particular kind 
- I• 1 __ is, to say the least, of very 
,1 .L."-'!'riety Tuttle, supra, 294 P. at 
r 1 1 -· ,.:.mj 1 1 s arlCfeo. 
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The Tuttle decision determined that accounts are ger 
eral statements or summaries; petitioner in Tuttle had no riqc" 
to mandatory relief to compel the use of or supervise the 
administrative details of the District's budget. 
Here, the trial court has imposed a mandate or injunc-
tion to require spending from the District's undistributed 
reserve. Such relief is not justified by the tests of the law 
Section 53-20-2 does not require a school district to create a·. 
undistributed reserve; the statute has "authorized" the Dis-
trict to "adopt a budget containing an amount known as the 
undistributed reserve." If a school district exercises this 
authority, the reserve must meet the statutory limitations 
provided. But that reserve arises in a climate of discretion: 
the Appellants prepare the budget to meet the needs of the 
population they serve. As Respondents admit, budgeting in-
volves discretion; budgeting rests on estimates which inher-
ently involve discretion and choices. (See U. C. A. § 5 3 - 7-9 I 
It is not for courts to impose mandates on the Appellants ate·:" 
what funds to spend; it is equally improper for a court to 
prohibit the Appellants from using a specific account item er• 
particular accounting method, especially when the techf'igue 
follows generally accepted accounting principles approve·l 
the State Board of Education. The trial court erred in tv•rt 
its injunctive orders, and it erred in its asserrion that e:• 
was not an area of discretion. The injunctive relief must 
1 
dissolved. 
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, l r SCHOOL BOARD DECISIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD 
UNLESS THFRE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
OR CLEAR ILLEGALITY 
The Respondents have failed to show that there has been 
3 ny abuse of ,11scretion on the part of the Appellants or any 
one of them. The only suggestion of abuse came from Olson who 
fo0nd the Appellants "ultra-conservative" in their approach to 
rlie budget. (Olson 40-41) Not only is "ultra-conservative" 
difficult to define in the context of the budget process, it 
nas nothing to do with abusing discretion or violating the law. 
In1unctive relief is not justified. 
It is now well settled in this state that the courts 
will not interfere with the actions taken by school boards 
1inless an action clearly abuses discretion or violates the law. 
The IJt-ah Supreme Court set the standard of judicial review in 
Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900, 903 (1932): 
It is well established that, if the action of 
the board of education is within the powers 
conferred upon it by the Legislature, and 
pertains to a matter in which the board is 
vested with authority to act, the courts will 
not review the action of such a board or 
substitute its judgment for that discre-
ti0n "The courts will not interfere with 
e'ercise of discretion by school d1rec-
matters confided by law to their 
Judgment oJnless there is a clear abuse of 
the rl;-c;cretion, or a violation of law. So 
tl-,e ts ace usually disinclined to inter-
-regulations adopted by school 
1s ,;rid they will not consider whether 
• '"'"' 1 11ol 11 l!Jns are wise or expedient, but 
,-, 1 "1,,-1_1,er they are a reasonable exercise 
ct thp rower and discretion of the board. 
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Acting reasoriably ·,..•ithin the powers con-
ferred, it is the province the boari 
education to determine what things are ietri-
nental to the successful good 
order, and discipline of the schools and the 
rules required to produce these conditions. 
The presumption is ah;ays in favor of the 
reasonableness and propriety of a rule or 
regulation duly made. The reasonableness of 
regulations is a question of law for the 
courts." (Citations omitted, emphasis 
added) 
This standard was reaffirmed in Petty v. Utah State 3oar: 
Reaents, 595 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Utah 1979), in ·w'1ic!-. 
assessments made by t'1at 3oard had been questioned: 
Applicable to this review, it is appropriate 
to r"ea::i!"!11. our comrnit:nent to t:'1ese ge!"'lera:.. 
propositions: that an aaencv 
should be a:lo;.1ed a comparatively wide lati-
tude of discretion in performing i<:s respon-
si2ilities anC that the cocrts n8t 
intrude or interfere therew i t'.1. unless t'."\e 
is so oppressive or that 
it be capricious anj 
or agency has in some way acted cont!"ary 
to law or in excess of its aut'.1.ority. CCJr.-
sistent that policy are not 
to S.isa;ree the vie-... · o: t:"'.e trial cot.:rt 
tha-: assessment of the $1)5 student fee was 
t!-le po,.;e::- of the Board of Re?e:.ts. 
omitted, emphasis 
In applying t'1is standard to the School 3oard's 
Education :i:.v v. 
1112, 1114 (1923): 
exc:Jsive £2r 
p..:.C:.i::: sc'.-'.oc: i:-:2e?e:-.::e:-.t c: :...--.e 
cc:i..::1:y gc·:er:-::-.er.:., ar..:. 1 i: :_';-.e -s.r-c-.::-.: :-e-
by tea:-= =£ 
by :c=a: :s 
_:e: t; :a,.; it is the duty of the county 
to such per cent on the 
assesca: pr=perty of the city as will raise 
E=ard has adopted cautious budget practices; it 
.:::-: i:o spend :no!1ey until i"': is certain it is there. 
the 3oard for being '1 ultra-
, the Respondents cannot argue that being 
Caution does not violate the law. 
CREDIT OF DISTRICT IS 
PC..:..CE::l .:..T RlSK BY THE I:\CORRECT 
OF TRIAL COURT 
f=r past several years the District has received 
·-._7:-.es: :ro:-'"! t":"':e e!'ltities which rate credit-worthiness, 
These high ratings influence the 
:-.ar<:e-: a;,.:; ha»:e permitted the District to enter the 
e:.: nari(ets at favorable rates. One 
1n ratings is the soundness of the 
its favorable funds balances have not 
!!1.terest rates are 
by conditions and any applicable 
are a:so i:-ifluenced by the financial 
(?. 230-31, 453) 
:he :avorable fund positio!"l. 
:2 District's top rating. I'o was 
change in rating. 
--r .)-
Respondents seek, by trying to reduce the District's unexpende' 
fund balances, will have an adverse impact on the credit wort> 
iness of the District. (R. 230-31) 
Each year the District borrows up to $7 million on ta•· 
anticipation notes to finance its M.& O. budget. The notes au 
redeemed as tax revenues are collected. (R. 453) 
The Respondents' argument below did not address annual borrN-
ings for the M.& o. budget. Changes in the District's budget 
techniques, court findings of illegality and injunctive contrc: 
of the budgeting process can only injure and confuse the 
District's actual financial standing. The trial court's con-
clusion that the financial standing of the District is not at 
risk is unsupported on the record; the only evidence 
was that of the Appellants who recounted the status of the 
District's rating and its fragile nature. 
If the District is forced by injunction to dip into 
reserves which it has previously left intact because it has 
been able to use contingent revenues through the Contingent 
Appropriations Account before using those reserves, then it car 
anticipate an adverse reaction from the rating agencies, 
in its credit rating and a corresponding increase in the cos. 
of borrowing money. The District faces harm which it cannnt 
repair because of the relief granted by the trial court· TLe 
balance of hardship between the few disguste<l taxpayers anl r" 
District clearly tilts away from a grant of injunctive relief 
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CONCLUSION 
The District has made only the two mandated leeways and 
has expended all the tax monies collected from those levies. 
Roth the taxing and budgeting actions taken by the Appellants 
have been lawful and proper. Consequently, there is no basis 
for a refund to the Respondents or for any other relief. The 
Appellants respectfully request that this Court dissolve both 
parts of the injunction that has been granted against them and 
that it make such declarations as it may deem necessary to 
permit the continued use of the Contingency Appropriations 
;ccount, to declare that the undistributed reserve in U.C.A. 
j53-20-2 is not the exclusive reserve which the District may 
ha:e in its budget, and to declare that the undistributed 
reserve in U.C.A. §53-20-2 shall not be used at any time for 
the negotiation, settlement or payment of contract salaries. 
"atecJ: Salt Lake City, Utah 
July 8, 1983 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
an 5. Bushnell 
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